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FISHING, FOWLING, AND DOCKOMINIUMS:  
MAINE’S NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE INTERTIDAL RIGHTS 
Agnieszka A. Pinette* 
 “The use of sea and air is common to all; neither can a title to the ocean belong 
to any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature nor public use and 
custom permit any possession therof.” 
- Elizabeth I Tudor, Letters (1533-1603)1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth recognized the public’s inalienable 
right to the sea.  Despite the intuitive concept embodied in the Queen’s 
pronouncement, a centuries-old debate over the public’s right to the seashore 
continues to occupy the attention of Maine’s bar and bench.  In 2011, for example, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, handed down a 
decision that maintains Maine’s prevailing judicial analytical framework for 
resolving property disputes in the intertidal zone.2  In McGarvey v. Whittredge,3 the 
plaintiffs, claiming ownership of the intertidal zone, brought an action in trespass 
and sought a declaratory judgment that the neighboring commercial scuba diving 
business operators and their customers had no right to cross the intertidal zone to 
access the ocean to scuba dive.4  The court’s unanimous judgment resolved the 
property interest at issue by holding that, as a matter of Maine common law, the 
public has a right to walk across the intertidal zone to access the ocean for purposes 
of scuba diving.5   
By confining its holding to a precise activity—traversing the intertidal zone to 
reach the ocean in order to scuba dive—the court was able to reach a unanimous 
judgment; however, the justices arrived at this common result through two evenly 
divided analyses supported by fundamentally different doctrinal approaches.  
Specifically, the analyses relied on disparate interpretations of the public trust 
                                                                                                     
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Maine School of Law.  Many thanks to Professors Laura S. 
Underkuffler and Gerald F. Petruccelli for their valuable insights. 
 1. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A TREATISE 410 (Ronald F. Roxburgh, ed., 3d ed, 
2008) (citing ELIZABETH I TUDOR (1533-1603), LETTERS). 
 2. The intertidal zone generally refers to the stretch of land between the ocean and the dry upland,  
which comprises much of Maine’s coastline.  More specifically, it is the land located between the mean 
high-water and mean low-water marks of tidal waters, but extending seaward no more than 100 rods 
from the high-water mark.  See Britton v. Donnell, 2011 ME 16, ¶ 6, 12 A.3d 39, 42. 
 3. 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620 (discussed in Part III.A). 
 4. Id. ¶ 1. 
 5. Id.  As discussed further in Part II,  there has been significant and ongoing debate in Maine as to 
whether the public trust rights with respect to the intertidal zone ought to be construed according to the 
Law Court’s pronouncements, which essentially confer fee ownership to the intertidal zone to the 
upland landowner and bestow to the public a limited right of use and access.  Nonetheless, for purposes 
of this Comment, the author assumes that the challenge to the fee ownership of the intertidal zone is 
settled according to the Law Court’s declarations. 
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doctrine and a seventeenth century colonial grant to espouse what I refer to here as 
either a “fundamentally purpose-driven” or an “elastic, activities-based” doctrinal 
approach.  Not surprisingly, the public trust doctrine and the historical grant are 
either silent or at best vague with respect to the proper designation of water-related 
property rights among public and private entities, and even less clear about how to 
address new and evolving uses of Maine’s water resources—many of which were 
not imaginable when these principles were established.  The fact that there is much 
disagreement both within and outside of Maine’s courtrooms regarding how they 
ought to be interpreted is therefore not remarkable.  It is noteworthy, however, that 
the modern judicial approach to resolving water use conflicts in light of this 
disagreement seems to favor the judicial principle of narrow construction, as 
opposed to the “Grand Style” of appellate decisionmaking.6  While such an 
approach to judicially resolving conflict is often in the nature of the common law 
tradition, it has not advanced a useful framework for the allocation of property 
rights and interests in Maine’s intertidal zone.   
The Law Court’s practice of resolving intertidal rights conflicts in Maine on a 
case-by-case and use-by-use basis is complemented by a similarly disordered 
overlay of federal, state, and municipal laws and rules applicable to emerging water 
uses.  Each of these levels of government is charged with safeguarding public 
interests, including public trust rights with respect to the intertidal zone.  
Accordingly, the administrative overlay is afflicted with problems typically 
associated with jurisdictional overlap—namely, the risks that regulatory decisions 
by three independent administrative levels of government will be made 
inefficiently, inconsistently, or both.  The more pressing problem with Maine’s 
regulation of emerging water uses, however, is not the lack of uniformity, but the 
irregular consideration of the public interest.  This regulatory gap, which is created 
by both statutory restrictions and legal limitations of administrative agencies 
undertaking property rights assessments, means that there is presently no assurance 
that regulators at any level of government will evaluate emerging water uses with 
an eye toward their potential deleterious effects on the public trust. 
Maine’s current judicial and administrative approaches to resolving water use 
conflicts are not without consequence.  They leave the bench, the bar, the 
landowner, and the public without a stable property rights framework upon which 
to rely to resolve future water use and access conflicts in the intertidal zone.  
Furthermore, these approaches tend to engender the incremental privatization of the 
public’s property interest in Maine’s water resources.  In a state where water access 
is the backbone of a dominant tourism industry, such privatization is, to say the 
least, a vulnerability.  To contextualize these consequences, Part II presents an 
overview of Maine’s cyclical demand for water access, and how the dockominium7 
                                                                                                     
 6.  KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:  DECIDING APPEALS (1960).  Llewellyn is 
credited for the term “Grand Style.”  See Thomas W. Mayo, Charles D. Breitel—Judging in the Grand 
Style, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 5, 5-12 (1978) (discussing the foundations and principles of Llewellyn’s 
central thesis). 
 7. The dockominium is a relatively modern real estate instrument modeled on the land-based 
condominium through which a boat owner may acquire a fee interest to a boat slip and attendant dock 
space.  Gurdon H. Buck, Drafting Documentation for Dockominiums, 18-JUN PROB. & PROP. 38, 38 
(2004). 
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offers an innovative market solution to Maine’s water access problems and at the 
same time raises serious questions about the long-term privatization of Maine’s 
seashore.  Part III then explores the relevant history and evolution of Maine’s 
judicial framework of riparian and littoral8 property rights and interests, identifies 
the doctrinal inconsistencies with the Law Court’s modern approach to resolving 
intertidal rights conflicts, and flags two underlying policies motivating the court’s 
modern approach.  Part IV highlights how the court’s doctrinal inconsistencies 
augment the regulatory discord at the administrative levels of government.  Finally, 
Part V summarizes the legal uncertainty facing public and private entities who wish 
to make novel use of Maine’s intertidal zone, calls on the Law Court to adopt a 
unified voice regarding the scope of the public trust, and recommends a factors-
based approach to resolving public and private intertidal rights conflicts—one that 
honors both of the policies underlying the court’s divergent doctrinal approaches in 
McGarvey.  
II.  MAINE’S DEMAND FOR WATER ACCESS,  
AND THE DOCKOMINIUM SUPPLY-SIDE SOLUTION   
Maine is a water-rich state.  Within its confines are roughly 5,000 miles of 
coastline, and nearly 1,500 square miles of inland waters that include 5,800 lakes 
and ponds and 32,000 miles of rivers and streams.9  These abundant waters, 
intermingled with Maine’s attractive landscape and highly valued natural resources, 
are the backbone of the state’s tourism industry.10  It should come as no surprise, 
then, that Maine is an outdoor recreation haven not only for its own residents,11 but 
also for the Northeast region of the United States and beyond.12  Maine’s 
concentration of housing units that are for seasonal, recreational, or occasional 
                                                                                                     
 8. Littoral refers to the shore of a lake or ocean, whereas riparian refers to the bank of a river or 
stream.  JONATHAN S. LYNTON, BALLENTINE’S LEGAL DICTIONARY & THESAURUS 386 & 590 (1995). 
 9. Maine State Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan 2009-2014, MAINE DEPT. OF 
CONSERVATION, BUREAU OF PARKS AND LANDS IV-1 (Dec. 2009), 
http://www.maine.gov/doc/parks/programs/SCORP/index.html [hereinafter SCORP].  The SCORP 
analyzes the demand for and supply of outdoor recreation areas and facilities.  It highlights the outdoor 
recreation issues of statewide importance, based on public and focus group comments, and presents 
broad priorities for expenditure of federal Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) dollars in 
Maine.  Id. 
 10. Tourism, Maine’s largest industry, “produc[es] $10.1 billion in goods and services, $425 million 
in tax revenue, and 140,000 jobs.”  Id. at III-3. 
 11. Maine residents participate in outdoor recreation at levels above regional and national averages.  
Maine participation rates are especially high in nature-based activities; for example, activities in which 
Mainers participate at least 10% above both regional and national levels include “boating (any)” and 
“motorboating.”  Id. at III-7. 
 12.  “In 2008, there were 15.4 million overnight visitors and 16.5 million day visitors in Maine,” 
with nonresidents comprising over 90% overnight visits and 53% of day visits.  Id. at III-4.  Moreover, 
Maine has a relatively high proportion of nonresident participation in recreation activities.  For example, 
Maine’s state parks report approximately 40% nonresident camper registrations.  Id. at III-1.  In fact, 
“natural attractions are a significant calling card drawing visitors—visitors who after coming to Maine, 
value what they experience.”  Id. at III-5. 
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use—the highest rate of second-home ownership in the nation13—is just one of 
many indicators of the state’s appeal as a vacation destination. 
Just as the interplay of attractive rural landscapes and access to amenities and 
services has driven the demand for second homes,14 so the allure of Maine’s water 
resources and attendant infrastructure has supported a steady stream of recreational 
boaters.  Nearly 57% of Maine residents—roughly 612,000 people—participate in 
some type of boating activity each year.15  These boaters have traditionally gained 
access to Maine’s waters by using public boating facilities, privately owned non-
commercial boat launches, or commercial marinas.16  Notwithstanding the 
abundance of natural waters in Maine, it is the presence or absence of accessible 
recreational infrastructure—in the form of boat launches, boat slips, parking areas, 
signage, fuel stations, and maintenance services—that enables recreational boating 
on some waters and impedes it elsewhere.   
Presumably in recognition of a need to secure access to Maine’s waters for 
public recreational boating, the Maine Legislature established the Boating Facilities 
Fund in 1963 and assigned administration of the fund to Boating Facilities Division 
of Maine’s Bureau of Parks and Lands in 1997.17  The fund assists local 
governments and other entities in acquiring, enhancing, and restoring boat 
launching facilities that are open to the public.18  Although these and other 
legislative and non-governmental efforts have helped to secure public boating 
access to many waters throughout the state, demand for more access remains, even 
in light of recent economic slow-down.19  
The demand for access to Maine’s waters is consistent with national trends.  
The $6.5 billion boating industry in the United States is predicted to grow at a rate 
                                                                                                     
 13.  Id. at II-6.  “Maine’s attractive landscapes and recreational amenities, along with its proximity 
to large population centers in the Northeast contribute to high percentages of seasonal homes.”  Id. 
 14.  Id. at IV-6. 
 15. Id.  at III-8 tbl.7. 
 16.  Maine supports 459 public boat launches, of which ninety-two are hand-carry sites and 
seventeen are tidal water sites, which are owned and maintained by state governmental agencies or 
municipal governments.  Id. at IV-16 tbl.11. 
 17.  38 M.R.S.A. § 322 (1965), repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 678, § 13 (effective June 30, 1998).  In 
1997, as part of the consolidation of the Bureau of Parks and Recreation with the Bureau of Public 
Lands (which formed the Bureau of Parks and Lands), the provisions of the law that established the fund 
were moved from Title 38 to Title 12.  See 12 M.R.S.A. § 1896 (2005) (pursuant to P.L. 1997, ch. 678, 
§ 13).  While there is no legislative history on point, it stands to reason that the need to secure public 
boating access prompted the Legislature to establish the Fund. 
 18.  SCORP, supra note 9, Introduction at 6.  “Sites on both tidal and non-tidal waters are eligible.  
Funding is available to assist in the development of hand-carry as well as trailered boat launching 
facilities.  However, since the Fund derives its revenue from a portion of the gasoline taxes generated by 
recreational motor boaters, priority is given to funding launching facilities that can be used by both 
motor and non-motorized watercraft.”  Id.  From 2003 to 2008, the Bureau acquired thirty new boating 
facilities and carried out forty facilities improvement projects.  Id. at I-2. 
 19.  For example, while the recession appears to have slowed demand for coastal water access in 
recent years, economist Charles Colgan predicts that, “[n]ew demands on the waterfront are emerging.  
The coast will be more crowded than ever.”  Janet Krenn, Working Waterfronts and Waterways, 43 VA. 
MARINE RESOURCE BULL., Winter 2011, at 8-9, available at http://vaseagrant.vims.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/VMRBWinter11_web.pdf. 
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of approximately 8% through 2014.20  At the same time, increasing land values for 
waterfront property during the most recent real estate boom induced the conversion 
of marinas with public boat slips to more lucrative residential development, leading 
to an access crisis for recreational boaters in some parts of the country.21  Congress 
has attempted to respond to the problem on several occasions with bills such as the 
2009 and 2011 Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act.22  The bills aimed to 
preserve and expand access to coastal waters for water-dependent commercial uses 
through a state-administered grant program.23  While these bills were ultimately 
defeated in committee,24 they are an indicator of the political challenges of 
preserving public access to the water as coastal property increases in value. 
Access problems for recreational boaters are not recent phenomena; rather, 
they are closely tied to the nation’s economic cycles.  In the booming 1980s, for 
example, demand for docking and mooring space far outstripped supply, thereby 
elevating premiums for slip rental rights and propelling the boating industry on a 
“bubble of frantic searches for places to moor pleasure boats.”25  The early 1990s 
were marked by falling boat slip prices, consistent with the decade’s real estate 
bust.26  As beneficiaries of the expanding economy began to purchase boats again 
in the early 2000s, boat slip prices rose accordingly.27   
It is likely that demand for recreational boat slips will again outstrip supply 
with the next economic upswing.  After all, whenever the natural human inclination 
to live near and play in the water28 becomes viable—as tends to happen with the 
availability of discretionary income during times of economic expansion—it 
encounters the natural, regulatory, and market limitations on expanding boating 
                                                                                                     
 20. Freedonia Group, Recreational Boating to 2014—Market Research, Market Share, Market Size, 
Sales, Demand Forecast, Market Leaders, Company Profiles, Industry Trends, 
http://www.freedoniagroup.com/Recreational-Boating.html (June 2012). 
 21.  See Ryck Lydecker, Boaters Get Bumped By Hot Real Estate Market, BOATUS (Mar. 2006), 
http://www.boatus.com/gov/fed/fed_archives/waterfront_article606.asp. 
 22.  Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2009, H.R. 2548, 111th Cong. (2009); Keep 
America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2011, H.R. 3109, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US (last visited Oct. 20, 2012), 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2548; Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2011, 
GOVTRACK.US (last visited Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3109. 
 25.  Buck, supra note 7, at 38. 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id. at 38-39. 
 28.  See, e.g., Mike Richards, Water in History, H2O—THE MYSTERY, ART, AND SCIENCE OF 
WATER, http://witcombe.sbc.edu/ water/history.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
Humans have generally settled near convenient sources of water.  Most of the great ancient civilizations 
depended on a particular source of water . . . .  Water facilitated relatively rapid transportation prior to 
about 1850 C.E.  In the era of exploration and discovery from the late 15th through the 18th centuries, 
Europeans explored all the major oceans and seas.  Water was also thought to be an essential aspect of 
imperialism from the 16th century on . . . .  Water was also an important source of power in the period 
before the Industrial Revolution . . . .  Beginning with the Industrial Revolution, however, water 
increasingly becomes a hidden factor in human history.  For many, it quite literally went underground, 
hidden from sight until one turned on a faucet or flushed a toilet.  Increasing [sic], there was a tendency 
to view it as something to master and control.  This is, of course, in accord with a more general 
approach to nature as a whole:  mastery and control. 
Id. 
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infrastructure.  These limitations include natural resource controls, such as physical 
and geographic features of the water resource and its adjoining shoreland that 
restrict the placement of the boat ramps, boat slips, and associated infrastructure; 
regulatory limits imposed through a range of local and federal permitting 
requirements; and market-based pressures to allocate access infrastructure to 
highest-and-best uses (which, as discussed, often means converting commercial 
marinas to other uses).  Accordingly, this type of unmet demand for water access is 
likely to place increased pressures on the market, in the form of higher prices for 
securing water access and attendant infrastructure; on natural resources, in the form 
of increased use of shores and waters; and on regulatory regimes, in the form of 
additional administrative and judicial actions spurred by increased permit requests 
and frequent water use conflicts. 
A.  The Dockominium “Solution” to the Recreational Boating Access Problem 
A relatively recent market response and an innovative legal solution to this 
cyclical access demand is the dockominium.  A dockominium is functionally a 
collection of boat slips, which is legally premised on a condominium ownership 
theory:  Persons may purchase an ownership interest in a dockominium in order to 
gain both the exclusive right to use a boat slip space (and presumably to exclude 
others from it) and a fractional interest in any association common areas, such as 
parking lots and off-season boat storage space.29  
A dockominium usually comes into being with the transformation of an 
established commercial marina offering short-term rental or day use boat slips to 
the public.30  Where states have adopted a version of the Uniform Common Interest 
Ownership Act (UCIOA), as Maine has done,31 “any estate or interest in, over, or 
under land . . .  [including] spaces that may be filled with air or water” is deemed 
real estate that may be developed into a common interest community, which is then 
divided into units and conveyed just like any interest in land.32  The “units” are 
essentially segments of riparian or littoral rights, consisting of the right to tie up a 
vessel to a dock within a measured and specific location.33  The location, with 
respect to the lateral configuration, is a two-dimensional space on the water’s 
surface that usually corresponds to some percentage of a floating dock or finger 
pier.34  With respect to the vertical configuration, upper and lower boundaries are 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Karin J. Wagner, Note, Geneva Lake Dockominiums:  An Exercise of Riparian Rights in 
Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine, 4 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 244 (1997) (citing Catherine Robinson 
Hall, Dockominiums:  In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 331, 331-50 
(1990)). 
 30.  Sarah Williams, Riparian Landowners Versus the Public:  The Importance of Roads and 
Highways for Public Access to Wisconsin's Navigable Waters, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 185, 215-16. 
 31.  33 M.R.S.A. §§ 1601 to 1604-118 (1999 & Supp. 2011) (Maine Condominium Act). 
 32.  Buck, supra note 7, at 39 (internal quotations omitted).  The Maine Condominium Act defines 
real estate as “any leasehold or other estate or interest in, over or under land . . .  [including] parcels with 
or without upper or lower boundaries and spaces that may be filled with air or water . . . .”  33 M.R.S.A. 
§ 1601-103(21).  As part of the declaration, declarants must record a plat or plan bearing the seal and 
signature of the preparer, and must show the locations and dimensions of the vertical boundaries of each 
unit, as well as any horizontal unit boundaries.  Id. § 1602-109(a), (d).  
 33.  Buck, supra note 7, at 42. 
 34. Id. 
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usually not specified or, if they are, run “vertically from the center of the earth to 
the heavens.”35   
Because the UCIOA adopts such a broad definition of the type of real estate 
that may be developed into common interest communities—and because the Maine 
Condominium Act bars the enactment of zoning, ordinances, or other regulations 
that prohibit the condominium form of ownership36—riparian and littoral rights can 
be severed from shoreland property and transferred separately from any land 
ownership interest.37  As a result, the dockominium, as a real estate instrument, 
effectively serves at least three market purposes:  First, it affords recreational 
boaters a secure tenure—namely, the exclusive right to occupy a three-dimensional 
space on, under, and above the water surface—during times of increasing demand 
for water access.  Second, it offers commercial marinas the opportunity to 
maximize profit by severing and selling off some or all of the boat slip inventory or 
by entirely privatizing the facility and eliminating all resource-intensive shore-side 
boating services.38  Third, it can serve as an attractive investment opportunity 
during times of economic expansion.39 
B.  Every Solution is a Problem:  The Dockominium “Solution”  
in Light of the Public’s Intertidal Rights 
Although the dockominium can serve as a market-based tool to ease the unmet 
demand for recreational water access, it is not without its own set of problems. As a 
real estate instrument, the dockominium raises questions concerning the scope of 
water-based property interests of public and private entities.  This is because the 
dockominium literally bridges the gap between the upland and the water.  
Notwithstanding the numerous ways of installing a dockominium and its attendant 
infrastructure (e.g., dredging, filling, or simply wharfing out), some portion of the 
dockominium will therefore either occupy or alter the intertidal zone—or both.  
And, consequently, that portion will exclude the public from the three-dimensional 
space which it occupies.40  This begs the question:  Do dockominiums, because 
they functionally privatize access to and use of the horizontal and vertical space 
affected by the facilities, come into conflict with any of the public’s reserved rights 
under the public trust doctrine?   
Several commentators have explored the potential property rights conflicts 
presented by dockominiums.41  In general, legal scholars contend that these types 
                                                                                                     
 35.  Id. 
 36.  33 M.R.S.A. § 1601-106.  Notably, the Act also prohibits governmental entities from enforcing 
any regulations or policies that are in conflict with its provisions.  Id. 
 37.  See Wagner, supra note 29, at 245; Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461, 467, 54 A. 1115, 1118 (1903) 
(ownership of intertidal zone may be separated by deed from ownership of adjacent upland). 
 38.  Mark Cheung, Dockominiums:  An Expansion of Riparian Rights that Violates the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1989). 
 39.  See Buck, supra note 7, at 38-39 (citing reports to high and rising prices for boat slip 
dockominiums during troubled national economic climates).   
 40. A dockominium is also likely to spur water use and access conflicts between dockominium 
“residents” and other boaters and users of the intertidal zone, and thereby may functionally exclude the 
public from some unfixed area beyond the footprint taken up by its physical infrastructure.   
 41.  See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 38; Hall, supra note 29; Wagner, supra note 29. 
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of facilities do threaten the public’s right of access to state waters under the public 
trust doctrine because such a legal construct grants private entities an exclusive 
property interest in the affected water.42  Courts, however, have been largely silent 
on the issue.  Only the Wisconsin courts have held that the conversion of a marina 
to a dockominium may violate that state’s public trust doctrine, notwithstanding 
riparian owners’ established rights to reasonable use of state waters.43  
Dockominium developments nonetheless remain quite popular on the east coast.44 
That different jurisdictions might adopt different approaches regarding the 
legitimacy of dockominiums in this respect should come as no surprise, given the 
Supreme Court’s long-standing instruction that the public trust doctrine should be 
enforced by each state “according to its own views of justice and policy.”45  
Consequently, to fully appreciate the property rights issues presented by 
dockominiums in Maine, the underpinnings of Maine’s public trust doctrine and 
other established water rights doctrines—as well as relevant statutory and 
regulatory frameworks—form necessary context.  This context is the subject of 
Parts III and IV, infra. 
III.  MAINE’S JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK OF RIPARIAN AND LITTORAL RIGHTS 
A. Colonial Roots 
Maine common law recognizes three categories of waters that are subject to 
some form of public servitude:  great ponds, tidal waters, and nontidal navigable 
rivers or streams.46  Each of these categories is defined quite differently.  Great 
                                                                                                     
 42.  See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 38; Hall, supra note 29; Wagner, supra note 29.  Relatedly, 
scholars seem to agree that dockominiums do not conflict with the riparian rights doctrine.  Id.  Thus, 
the owner of shoreland adjoining a  lake or river is free to transfer his littoral or riparian rights to one or 
more entities without any legal ties to the adjoining land, despite the fact that the land vested in him 
solely because of his original title to the shoreland.   
 43.  See, e.g., ABKA P’ship v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 2001 WI App 223, ¶¶ 1-4, 247 Wis.2d 
793, 802-03, 635 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) , aff’d on other grounds, 2002 WI 106, 255 
Wis. 2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 2002).  In 1994, ABKA sought administrative approval for the 
conversion of a 407-unit rented boat slip marina on Lake Geneva into dockominiums; however, the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources asserted that ABKA was legally required to withhold some 
of the slips from sale for rent by the public.  Id. ¶ 1, 247 Wis. 2d at 802-03, 635 N.W.2d at 171-72.  The 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin upheld the administrative decision, stating that the dockominium 
development violated the public trust doctrine and was not a reasonable riparian use of state waters.  Id. 
¶ 4, 247 Wis. 2d at 803, 635 N.W.2d at 172.   The Supreme Court of Wisconsin also held that the 
conversion violated the public trust doctrine, but based its decision on Wisconsin statutory law rather 
than on common law.  ABKA P’ship, 2002 WI 106 at ¶ 2, 255 Wis. 2d at 493-94, 648 N.W.2d at 857.  
See also Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine:  A Lakeside View Into the 
Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123 (2012) (discussing Wisconsin’s legal framework for protecting 
public water rights, and the state’s successes and failures in administering the public trust doctrine); 
Sarah Williams, Comment, Riparian Landowners Versus the Public:  The Importance of Roads and 
Highways for Public Access to Wisconsin's Navigable Waters, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 185, 216-17 (2010). 
 44.  Williams, supra note 43, at 216. 
 45.  Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894). 
 46.  See Knud E. Hermansen & Donald R. Richards, Maine Principles of Ownership Along Water 
Bodies, 47 ME. L. REV. 35, 39 (1995).  Hermansen & Richards also identify nonnavigable streams as a 
category of water bodies recognized by Maine common law.  Id.  This water category, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Comment because Maine common law does not recognize the imposition of a 
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ponds are identified by their physical characteristics:  they are bodies of standing 
water with a surface area of ten acres or more.47  The definition of tidal waters is 
tethered to the influence of the tides; thus, tidal waters include not only ocean 
waters, but also rivers affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, irrespective of the 
fresh or brackish quality of the water.48  By contrast, nontidal navigable rivers and 
streams are defined based on their function as flowing waters capable of being used 
at least part of the year “for the purposes of commerce, for the floating of vessels, 
boats, rafts or logs,”49 and for reasonable public transportation or commercial use.50   
Despite their disparate contexts, these definitions—and their attendant public 
servitudes—share roots in the English common law tradition.  Hale’s treatise, De 
Jure Maris,51 was particularly influential in the development of common law in the 
United States with regard to riparian and littoral title.52  In essence, Hale 
characterized the beds of all freshwater rivers and streams as  private property, but 
emphasized a sovereign interest in “common passage”; thus, the King had a duty to 
protect, for the public’s safety and convenience, those streams and rivers which 
were navigable by large or small vessels.53  Moreover, Hale regarded both tidal 
waters and intertidal lands as belonging, prima facie, to the sovereign.54 
Hale’s private property right and public use characterizations have been quoted 
in Maine case law contending with water rights from as early as 182555 and 
                                                                                                     
public servitude on nonnavigable streams.  See Davis v. Winslow, 51 Me. 264, 297 (1863) (“The 
general doctrine . . . in reference to the use of navigable rivers, or public streams, as public highways, is, 
that each person has an equal right to their reasonable use.”). 
 47.  Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950). 
 48.  See Lapish v. President of the Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831) (holding that riparian owners’ 
rights extended to the edge of a stream “at all hours of the tide in its ebbing and flowing; or, in other 
words, as far as low water mark”); Stone v. City of Augusta, 46 Me. 127, 137 (1858) (holding that the 
an interest in land bounded by the “bank” of a tidal brook only extended to the high tide mark, but 
noting that in some cases a boundary that is a river itself could include the low tide mark).  “Stone 
makes clear that the intent of the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance is directed at the ebbing and 
flowing of the tide and not at whether the nature of the water is fresh, brackish, or salty.”  Hermansen & 
Richards, supra note 46, at 39 n.12. 
 49.  Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 20-22 (1849) (holding that “streams or rivers as are not 
floatable, that cannot, in their natural state, be used for the carriage of boats, rafts, or other property, are 
wholly and absolutely private; not subject to the servitude of the public interest, nor to be regarded as 
public highways, by water, because they are not susceptible of use, as a common passage for the 
public.”); see also Hermansen & Richards, supra note 46, at 41-42. 
 50.  See Brown, 31 Me. at 22-23. 
 51.  MATTHEW HALE, DE JURE MARIS, reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE 
FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO AND HALL’S ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN IN 
THE SEA-SHORE 370-413 (3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter DE JURE MARIS]. 
 52.  See, e.g., Robert W. Malmsheimer & Donald W. Floyd, Fishing Rights in Nontidal, Navigable 
New York State Rivers:  A Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 147, 157-58 & 
n.84 (1998).   
 53.  DE JURE MARIS, supra note 51, at 372; see also Commonwealth v. Chapin, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 
199, 201-02 (1827). 
 54.  DE JURE MARIS, supra note 51, at 376, 378 (characterizing a sovereign proprietary right to the 
branches of the sea which lie within the fauces terrae, including the shore, which is “that ground that is 
between the ordinary high-water and low-water mark”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 181 (Me. 1989); State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 
A. 875, 876 (1909); Veazie v. Dwinel, 50 Me. 479, 489-90 (1862); State v. Inhabitants of Freeport, 43 
Me. 198, 201-02 (1857); Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552, 561-62 (1856); Pike v. Munroe, 36 Me. 309, 313 
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including, most recently, by the Law Court in McGarvey v. Whittredge.56  
Moreover, definitions paralleling Hale’s characterizations are codified in several 
Maine statutory provisions.57  In short, both Maine’s common law and the state’s 
statutory framework of water rights are grounded in large part on Hale’s doctrine.  
Thus, in Maine, the beds of tidal waters (so-called submerged lands) are owned by 
the state, the beds of nontidal waters are privately owned by the upland owners, and 
private ownership beneath navigable waters is subject to the public’s use of the 
water as a public highway.58   
Two exceptions to this grounding in Hale’s doctrine, however, are Maine’s 
property rights treatment of great ponds and of intertidal lands.  Maine common 
law, unlike that of most states, has been heavily influenced by the Massachusetts 
Colonial Ordinance of 1641,59 which reads in part: 
Everie Inhabitant who is an hous-holder shall have free fishing and fowling, in any 
great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers so far as the Sea ebs and flows, within the 
precincts of the town where they dwell, unles the Free-men of the same town, or 
the General Court have otherwise appropriated them . . .  [I]t is declared that in all 
creeks, coves and other places, about and upon salt water where the Sea ebs and 
flows, the Proprietor of the land adjoining shall have proprietie to the low water 
mark where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever 
it ebs farther.  Provided that such proprietor shall not by this libertie have power 
to stop or hinder the passage of boats or other vessels in, or through any sea 
creeks, or coves to other mens houses or lands.60 
Notably, the Ordinance was amended in 1647 to forbid towns to appropriate 
“to any particular person or persons any great pond containing more than ten acres 
of land” and to grant a common right of pedestrian access across privately owned 
land to reach any such great pond.61  The Ordinance’s recognition of a public right 
                                                                                                     
(1853); Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343, 357 (1850); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 14 (1849); Littlefield 
v. Littlefield, 28 Me. 180, 184 (1848); Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 55 (1845); 
Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 Me. 278, 282 (1834); Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273, 290 (1831); Berry v. Carle, 
3 Me. 269, 273 (1825). 
 56.  2011 ME 97, ¶ 36, 28 A.3d 620. 
 57.  See, e.g., 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 1862 & 1865 (2005 & Supp. 2011) (addressing right of the State to 
lease submerged and intertidal lands owned by the State, contingent upon consideration of the public 
trust); 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 436-A(7) & 480-B(5) (2001 & Supp. 2011) (a “great pond” is any inland body of 
water which  has a surface area in excess of ten acres); 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 571-73 (2005) (codifying the 
public trust in the Submerged & Intertidal Lands Act, discussed further at Part II.B). 
 58.  See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:  
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61-62 
(citing to Stanton v. Trustees of St. Joseph’s Coll., 233 A.2d 718, 721-22 (Me. 1967); In re Opinions of 
the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 567, 106 A. 865, 868 (1919); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849)). 
 59.  See Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells be Eroded with Time?, 57 ME. L. REV. 
117, 119-20 (2005). 
 60.  BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETS (Thomas G. Barnes, ed., 1975) (emphasis added). 
 61.  Specifically, the Ordinance was amended to read:  “And for great ponds lying in Common, 
through within the bounds of some Town, it shall be free for any man to fish and fowle there, and may 
pass and repass on foot through any man’s propriety for that end, so they trespass not upon any man’s 
Corn or Meadow.”  THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 91 (William H. Whitmore, ed., 1887), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=Vzno-
EGGVcoC&ots=OC_uZHJ0ei#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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to access great ponds was a “radical departure from the principles of law 
recognized by . . . the common law of England,”62 which had long recognized a 
private property right in all ponds and no reserved jus publicum.63  
As more fully explained in Part III.B, the Law Court has repeatedly stated that 
the Colonial Ordinance was incorporated into Maine common law as a matter of 
custom and usage.64  Consequently, the court has held that the Maine common law, 
interpreted according to the terms of the Ordinance’s grant, vests in the public a 
right to cross privately owned woodland to access great ponds.65  Similarly, the 
court has invoked this same principle as the foundational control on the public’s 
rights to the intertidal zone:  Applying the Ordinance-grounded common law to 
water law controversies, the court has consistently declared that private landowners 
hold fee title to the lands between the high-water and low-water marks, extending 
no more than 100 rods from the high-water mark,66 and the court has unwaveringly 
held that this private ownership is subject to the public’s right to use the intertidal 
zone.67   
B.  Judicial Interpretation of Colonial Roots  
to Resolve Modern Water Use Conflicts 
The Supreme Court’s line of cases in the 1800s established that the states (1) 
acquired title to the beds and banks of navigable waters at the time of statehood, (2) 
have broad authority to redefine any such acquired property rights,68 and (3) have 
an inalienable duty to protect lands in the public trust—i.e., the jus publicum.69  
After these cases, virtually every state in the union modified its inherited English 
common law to curtail riparian rights for private owners and expand them for 
public access and use.70  The Law Court, however, in a series of cases handed 
down since the mid-1980s, blazed a different trail, by declining to interpret the 
scope of public rights within the intertidal zone to include an easement for general 
                                                                                                     
 62.  Herbert E. Locke, Right of Access to Great Ponds by the Colonial Ordinance, 12 ME. L. REV. 
148, 149 (1919).  
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 184 (Me. 1989). 
 65.  Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 451 (1882). 
 66.  See, e.g., Craig, supra note 58, at 61-62 (citing to State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 887 (Me. 1952); 
Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384 (1847); Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me. 482 (1844); 
Lapish v. President of Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85 (1831)). 
 67.  See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 9, 28 A.3d 620.  
 68.  See Craig, supra note 58, at 5-7 & nn.13 & 16 (citing to Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 
(1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380 
(1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891)). 
 69.  On the distinct property rights of  jus publicum and jus privatum: 
[P]ublic trust land is viewed as being ‘vested with two titles: the jus publicum, the public's right to use 
and enjoy trust lands and waters for commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and other related public 
purposes, and the jus privatum, or the private proprietary rights in the use and possession of trust lands.’  
In other words, while in many ways the jus publicum title may be considered something less than fee 
simple ownership, it also cannot be sold.  
Michael P. Dixon, Drawing Lines in the Disappearing Sand:  A Re-Evaluation of Shoreline Rights and 
Regimes A Quarter Century After Bell v. Town of Wells, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 481, 490 (2011) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 70.  Id. at 491-92. 
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public recreation.  In what have become known notoriously as the “Moody Beach 
decisions,”71 the court stated that the public right did not extend to “bathing, 
sunbathing, and [recreational] walking on privately owned intertidal lands.”72   
The court’s pronouncement—that the public’s right to access and use the 
intertidal zone is necessarily constrained by the plain meaning of the Colonial 
Ordinance—was a major deviation from its earlier case law73 and has been a source 
of significant controversy.  Although the debate in Maine has revolved around the 
origins of public and private property rights to the intertidal zone and whether the 
court erred in finding that the Colonial Ordinance granted title to the intertidal zone 
to private landowners, the controversy has also focused on the scope of the public’s 
rights in light of the Ordinance’s explicit language, its underlying purpose, and the 
evolution of Maine’s common law since the Ordinance’s incorporation.74  In 
essence, the Moody Beach cases triggered an ongoing debate about whether the 
public trust should be construed narrowly and consistent with the Ordinance’s 
expressly referred rights of “fishing,” “fowling,” and the passage of boats and 
vessels (typically denoted as the right of “navigation”); whether the public’s rights 
should be construed consistent with the Ordinance’s underlying purpose to enable 
access to the ocean in order to obtain sustenance or economic benefit; or whether 
the public’s rights should be interpreted more broadly through the lens of the jus 
publicum, irrespective of the Ordinance. 
Nonetheless, the Law Court has reaffirmed the Moody Beach holding in 
several cases since 1989, framing the public interest in the intertidal zone as a 
relatively narrow right limited to “fishing, fowling, and navigation, or other 
activities with the permission of the landowner.”75  The court has also 
                                                                                                     
 71.  See Orlando E. Delogu, An Argument to the State of Maine, the Town of Wells, and Other Maine 
Towns Similarly Situated: Buy the Foreshore—Now, 45 ME. L. REV. 243, 243 (1993) (observing the 
usage of the common name); see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986) (deciding 
procedural issues in the principal case); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) [hereinafter 
Bell II] (addressing the balance of public and private rights in the intertidal zone). 
 72.  Bell II, supra note 71, at 176.  See also id. at 173 (“The terms ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling,’ and 
‘navigation,’ liberally interpreted, delimit the public’s right to use [the intertidal zone].”). 
 73.  See James v. Inhabitants of the Town of W. Bath, 437 A.2d 863, 865 (Me. 1981) (“A consistent 
theme in the decisional law is the concept that Maine’s tidal lands and resources . . .  are held by the 
State in a public trust for the people of the State . . . .”); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 
1981) (noting that other public uses may be recognized in intertidal zone, beyond historical purposes for 
which public trust principle was developed). 
 74.  See Mark Cheung, Rethinking the History of the Seventeenth-Century Colonial Ordinance:  A 
Reinterpretation of an Ancient Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115 (1990) (arguing for examination of the 
“historical precedents upon which the Ordinance is based”); Orlando E. Delogu, Intellectual 
Indifference—Intellectual Dishonesty:  The Colonial Ordinance, The Equal Footing Doctrine, and The 
Maine Law Court, 42 ME. L. REV. 43, 44 (1990) (arguing that the Bell II court failed to “examine or 
appreciate the intent and purpose of the Colonial Ordinance”); Alison Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use, 
and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REV. 5, 35 (1990) (“Contrary  to  suggestions  that the  Colonial  
Ordinance  of  1641-47 abrogated  the  English  common  law  respecting  the  foreshore,  the 
fundamental  principle  of English  law  was  in  fact  incorporated  into the  Colonial  Ordinance.”); but 
see Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells be Eroded with Time?, 57 ME. L. REV. 117 (2005) 
(responding to critics of Bell II and arguing that decision correctly applies the existing law of private 
property, of which the Ordinance is just one source).   
 75.  Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 33 n.8, 823 A.2d 551; 
see also, e.g., Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶¶ 34,, 760 A.2d 232 (finding that prescriptive 
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acknowledged that the public’s interest is further “subject to the [adjacent upland or 
intertidal land]owner’s ‘right to wharf out to the navigable portion of the body of 
water,”76 even though “[t]hese rights have long been subject to reasonable 
regulation . . . to protect the public’s rights, pursuant to the public trust doctrine.”77 
C.  Post-Moody Beach Elucidation? 
The Law Court revisited the scope of Maine’s public trust doctrine last year in 
McGarvey v. Whittredge when several owners of oceanfront property bordering 
Passamaquoddy Bay in the Town of Eastport filed a declaratory judgment action 
seeking a determination that their neighbors, who operated a commercial scuba 
diving business, had no right to cross the intertidal zone to access the ocean.78  The 
unanimous Law Court held that the public’s right included the “right of the public 
to pass over the intertidal zone to reach the ocean in order to scuba dive.”79  
However, the court declined to speak to whether the public has a trust right to any 
other uses of the intertidal zone.  The court’s equally split opinion reached this 
holding on starkly divergent reasoning. 
While solidly affirming that the upland owner’s fee title to the intertidal zone 
was an artifact of the Colonial Ordinance, Chief Justice Saufley, joined by Justices 
Mead and Jabar, acknowledged not only that Hale’s treatise suggests that a public 
right of access over the zone existed long before the Ordinance’s enactment,80 but 
also that “nothing in the Colonial Ordinance, or the pronouncement of the common 
law that followed in the decades after [its] expiration . . . evidenced an intent to 
change or limit the jus publicum—the public’s right in the intertidal lands—except 
to the extent that those rights might interfere with the right of the landowner to 
wharf out.”81  Moreover, Justice Saufley rejected the “rigid interpretation of the 
public trust rights” championed in the Moody Beach decisions as exclusively 
restricted to fishing, fowling, and navigation,82 and instead reasoned that the 
respondents’ underlying purpose for crossing the intertidal zone—namely, to reach 
the ocean to scuba dive—was among the purposes consistent with the jus 
                                                                                                     
easement granted general recreational public right across dry sand portion of intertidal zone, but 
declining to extend the public trust doctrine holding in Bell II); but see Norton v. Town of Long Island, 
2005 ME 109, ¶ 33, 883 A.2d 889 (noting the continued viability of Bell II, but also observing that 
Maine is unusual among other states in this area of law); Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 50, 760 A.2d 232 
(Saufley, J., concurring) (stating that Bell II should be overruled). 
 76.  Conservation Law Found., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 36, 823 A.2d 551 (quoting Great Cove Boat Club v. 
Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 95 (Me. 1996)).  The common law provides owners of land abutting 
a body of water certain rights beyond those of the public, including  
(1) the right to have the water remain in place and retain, as nearly as possible, its natural character, (2) 
the right of access to the water; (3) subject to reasonable restrictions, the right to wharf out to the 
navigable portion of the body of water, and (4) the right of free use of the water immediately adjoining 
the property for the transaction of business associated with wharves.   
Great Cove Boat Club, 672 A.2d at 95. 
 77.  Britton v. Donnell, 2011 ME 16, ¶ 8, 12 A.3d 39; see also Great Cove Boat Club, 672 A.2d at 
95 (“[T]he right to wharf-out, [is] not absolute, but rather [is] subject to [] reasonable regulation . . . .”). 
 78.  McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620. 
 79.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 80.  Id. ¶ 18 & n.9. 
 81.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 82.  Id. ¶ 56. 
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publicum—namely, the right to cross the zone “to reach the ocean for ocean-based 
activities.”83  In essence, Justice Saufley espoused a fundamentally purpose-driven 
doctrinal approach to interpreting the public’s intertidal rights.  
In contrast, Justice Levy, joined by Justices Alexander and Gorman, 
emphasized the doctrine of stare decisis and the import to society of a stable 
property rights regime84 as the basis for essentially upholding the Moody Beach 
decisions and circumscribing the public’s right to the intertidal zone by “the terms 
‘fishing’ fowling, and navigation.’”85  Even so, the concurring opinion 
acknowledged that the Ordinance’s triad “should be given a ‘sympathetically 
generous’ and broad interpretation . . . so as to account for evolving social and 
commercial circumstances.”86  Then, applying the “expansive and adaptive force” 
of the common law, Justice Levy reasoned that scuba diving was an activity within 
the ambit of the right to navigation and concluded that traversing across the 
intertidal zone for that purpose was incidental to that right.87  Thus, Justice Levy 
championed what might be loosely characterized as an elastic, activities-based 
doctrinal approach to interpreting the public’s intertidal rights. 
Despite its divergent reasoning, the McGarvey court adhered to a long line of 
cases wherein it resolved water rights controversies through a string of functional 
definitions.  For example, while the Law Court has affirmed in all three water 
categories88 the common right to fish and navigate the state’s navigable waters,89 it 
has recognized the public’s right to cut ice, bathe, skate, ride upon the ice, and take 
water for domestic or agricultural purposes or for use in the arts only on great 
ponds.90  Consequently, McGarvey has done little to ameliorate the pragmatic 
effect of the Moody Beach decisions.  Even if lawyers were to take their cues from 
the Chief Justice’s opinion, which seems to liberate courts from a strict Moody 
Beach-style interpretation of the Colonial Ordinance, it gives little guidance to 
what other uses of the intertidal zone will fall within the jus publicum.  As before, 
lawyers will likely continue to resort to heavy use of the “analogize-and-
distinguish” tool in the advocacy toolbox (depending on which side of the “v.” they 
represent).  Accordingly, a party seeking to establish a new public activity in the 
intertidal zone will argue that the activity is similar to digging for worms91 or 
                                                                                                     
 83.  Id. ¶¶ 49-51.  The Chief Justice made clear that the foundational purpose for the public’s right to 
the intertidal was to access the ocean and tidal zone, stating that “[t]here can be no question that . . . the 
public has a right to use the ocean itself.”  Id. ¶ 12. 
 84.  Id. ¶¶ 63-67 (Levy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 85.  Id. ¶ 59 (quoting Bell II, supra note 71, at 173). 
 86.  Id. ¶ 68 (quoting Bell II, supra note 71, at 173). 
 87.  Id. ¶¶ 76-77. 
 88.  See supra Part III.A (identifying the three categories). 
 89.  See Gratto v. Palangi, 154 Me. 308, 312, 147 A.2d 455, 458 (1958) (recognizing rights to use 
“great ponds,” including right to fish); Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 485 (1854) (recognizing a right 
to fish in “seas or creeks or arms thereof”); Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 341, 356 (recognizing a right to 
navigate on all navigable waters, including “lakes and fresh water rivers, which are navigable”). 
 90.  Gratto v. Palangi, 154 Me. 308, 313, 147 A.2d 455, 458 (1958) (recognizing rights of 
swimming, boating, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, riding upon the ice, and taking water for 
domestic or agricultural purposes or for use in the arts in great ponds); Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28, 
71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950) (recognizing a right to cut ice upon great ponds). 
 91.  State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 887 (Me. 1952). 
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clams,92 recreational power boating,93 traveling over frozen waters,94 discharging 
and taking on boat passengers,95 driving or resting cattle,96 and scuba diving97—
uses the court has accepted as within the sphere of the enumerated public trust 
rights.   Conversely, the other side will argue that the activity is more like cutting 
ice,98 harvesting mussel-bed manure,99 and bathing100—uses the court has, to date, 
rejected.   Thus, even though Maine’s property framework of riparian and littoral 
rights originates in “established” common law,101 the court continues to resolve 
many of its water-related property rights controversies in a largely reactive, use-by-
use fashion.   
Notwithstanding the Law Court’s use-by-use approach to resolving intertidal 
rights controversies, McGarvey sheds light on two key public policies that are at 
the heart of much of Maine’s modern water rights jurisprudence:  (1) society’s 
interest in a stable and predictable property rights regime,102 and (2) society’s 
interest in a continually evolving common law that “reflect[s] the realities of a 
changing world.”103  The McGarvey court recognized these policies as the 
motivation behind both the fundamentally purpose-driven and the elastic, activities-
based doctrinal approach to resolving intertidal rights conflicts; however, each 
opinion unmistakably emphasized one policy at the expense of the other.  Thus, the 
court did not reach consensus, or even majority agreement, as to how a balance 
among these policies ought to be struck.   
In the end, McGarvey offers neither much predictability nor much evolutionary 
accommodation when it comes to resolving use conflicts in the intertidal zone, as 
both doctrinal approaches leave unclear what emerging uses might fall within or 
outside the scope of the public trust.  Moreover, the modern judicial method, when 
combined with an inconsistent administrative approach to resolving such conflicts 
(discussed immediately below), serves to augment the policy discord.   
                                                                                                     
 92.  Moulton, 37 Me. at 493-94. 
 93.  See Gratto, 154 Me. at 312-14, 147 A.2d at 458-60. 
 94.  See French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434-35 (1841). 
 95.  See Andrews v. King, 124 Me. 361, 362-64, 129 A. 298,299 (1925). 
 96.  See Bell II, supra note 71, at 173 n.15. 
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IV.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE OVERLAY:   
MAINE’S STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PATCHWORK 
Federal, state, and municipal entities play a key role in regulating land uses in 
the state and, in doing so, can define the scope of private property and public use 
rights.  Indeed, water rights, like all other rights, are subject to such reasonable 
regulations as are essential to the general public welfare.104  However, the 
concurrent regulatory authority of many agencies at different levels of 
government—and with sometimes disparate objectives—presents the risk that 
regulators will pull at the strands of the property rights fiber in different directions.  
The overlay applicable to emerging water uses illustrates that Maine’s riparian and 
littoral rights regime has certainly not curtailed this risk.  
A.  Federal Review:  The Army Corps of Engineers 
At the federal level, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) 
has jurisdiction to regulate waterway obstructions over all navigable waters of the 
United States.105  The Corps generally defines navigable waters as “those waters 
that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have 
been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign 
commerce.”106  Accordingly, in Maine, the Corps can regulate emerging water uses 
such as dockominiums located on any tidal waters and their tributaries to the head 
of tide, as well on any major river of the state and on Lake Umbagog.107  
While the primary focus of the Corps’ regulatory program has been to 
safeguard navigation,108 a relatively recent secondary objective involves the 
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(2011). 
 107.  See What Are the Limits of the Corps Jurisdiction?, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS—NEW 
ENGLAND DISTRICT, 4 (Jul. 2012), 
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/Regulatory/JD/JurisdictionLimits.pdf. 
 108.  See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 194-95 (1967) (affirming the 
propriety of Corps action to remove a sunken barge containing containers of liquid chlorine from the 
Mississippi River); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 405 (1929) (“[Sections 9 and 10 of] [t]he act of 
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protection of the nation’s water resources.109  Thus, the Corps’ general regulatory 
policies applicable to the review of all of its permit applications invoke a “public 
interest review,” which calls for an “evaluation of the probable impacts . . . of the 
proposed activity and its intended use on the public interest” through “a careful 
weighing” of public and private interest factors.110  These factors include 
“conservation, economics . . . general environmental concerns . . . navigation . . . 
considerations of property ownership, and, in general, the needs and welfare of the 
people.”111  The Corps’ general regulatory policies also include consideration of 
property ownership, recognizing that the “right to reasonable private use . . . is 
subject to the rights and interests of the public in the navigable and other waters of 
the United States” and that “[a] riparian landowner’s general right of access to 
navigable waters . . . is subject to the similar rights of access held by nearby 
riparian landowners and to the general public’s right of navigation on the water 
surface.”112  The policies stress that projects which create “undue interference with 
access to, or use of, navigable waters” are not likely to be authorized.113   
However, the agency’s general regulatory policies also emphasize that Corps 
permits do not convey any property rights or exclusive privileges, and stress that 
the agency will not undertake any independent reviews of an applicant’s 
affirmation that he or she possesses “the requisite property interest” to undertake 
the project.114  Consequently, any section 10 permits issued by the Corps for 
emerging water uses in Maine would likely presume the presence of clear title, and 
would instead focus on whether or not the proposals would create physical barriers 
to the navigable channels of waters. 
B.  State Review:  The Bureau of Parks and Lands 
The Bureau of Parks and Lands (“the Bureau”), within Maine’s Department of 
Conservation, administers intertidal and submerged lands owned by the state.115  In 
general, submerged land consists of land from the mean low-water mark out to the 
seaward boundary of coastal waters, land below the mean low-water mark of tidal 
rivers, land below the natural mean low-water mark of great ponds, and the 
riverbeds of international boundary rivers.116   
As discussed in Part III, title to Maine’s submerged lands has long been held 
by the state, according to Maine’s enduring common law tradition rooted in Hale’s 
property rights doctrine, whereas title to intertidal lands is generally privately held 
by the owner of the upland.  In fact, in 1989, the court went so far as to find the 
Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act (PTILA)—enacted by the Maine Legislature in 
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1986 largely in response to the court’s first Moody Beach decision and declaring 
that the “intertidal lands of the State are impressed with a public trust,” including a 
“right to use intertidal land for recreation”117—a facially unconstitutional taking of 
private property without just compensation because it functionally created an 
unlimited public recreational easement that went beyond the recognized common 
law right of fishing, fowling, and navigation.118  The court was heavily criticized 
for failing to recognize both that (1) the police power could be applied to limit the 
potential nuisance effects of public recreation and (2) the legislative branch ought 
to play its judicially-recognized role in defining the scope of the common law 
public rights.119 Nonetheless, the lasting effect of the Moody Beach decisions was 
to suppress the authority of the state’s executive and legislative branches to 
interpret the scope of the public trust beyond the court’s construction of the 
Colonial Ordinance.  As a result, the Bureau’s authority to regulate emerging uses 
in the intertidal zone is limited to the rare instance where the state holds fee title to 
intertidal land—i.e., when it acquires such land through fee purchase.120   
In those rare instances, pursuant to legislative authority under the Submerged 
and Intertidal Lands Act (SILA),121 the Bureau is empowered to transfer the state’s 
interest in intertidal lands to private entities under certain conditions, as it may do 
with its submerged lands.  For example, as part of its submerged lands leasing 
program, the Bureau may lease the right, or grant assignable thirty-year easements, 
to construct “causeways, bridges, marinas, wharves, docks, pilings [or] moorings” 
on state-owned submerged and intertidal lands.122  The Bureau may refuse to issue 
such a lease if it determines that the lease would “unreasonably interfere” with 
“navigation . . . fishing or other existing marine uses of the area, [or] ingress and 
egress of riparian owners.”123  Likewise, the Bureau may refuse to issue either a 
lease or a term easement if it determines that such a lease or easement would 
unreasonably interfere with “customary or traditional public access ways to or 
public trust rights in, on or over the intertidal or submerged lands and the waters 
above those lands.”124   
In accordance with the SILA, the Bureau promulgated rules to “ensure a 
consistent and standard approach to the management of the Submerged Lands of 
Maine . . . .”125  Under these rules, the Bureau will issue a lease or grant a term 
easement if it finds that the proposed use of the state-owned lands (1) will not 
“unreasonably interfere” with, inter alia, “navigation,” “ingress and egress of 
riparian owners,” and “customary or traditional public access ways to, or public 
trust rights in, on or over Submerged Lands and the waters above those lands”; and 
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(2) is not otherwise “contrary to the public interest.”126  In addition to specifying 
the standards of review, the area of lands conveyed by leases and easements, and 
renewal and termination provisions, the rules stipulate that the Bureau may require 
mitigation measures such as boat launching ramps, parking spaces, or public 
walkways from the lessee or easement holder to compensate the public for the loss 
of its customary access rights.127  Notably, the rules also specify that any interest 
conveyed by a lease or easement in state-owned submerged lands may not be 
severed from the title in the adjacent upland without invalidating the lease or 
extinguishing the easement interest.128 
Moreover, the use of state-owned submerged and intertidal lands for 
dockominiums is plainly within the statutory authority of the SILA.  The Act, for 
example, defines dockominiums as “slip space that is sold or leased by a lessee of 
submerged lands to a boat or vessel owner for more than one year.”129  The SILA 
also contemplates how the fee structure should be calculated for dockominium-
related slips that are not rented or leased to the general public.130  And, in 1988, the 
Maine Legislature enacted a statutory “brake” on the development of 
dockominiums on state-owned submerged and intertidal lands,131 thereby 
indicating that the pre-1988 regulations also contemplated dockominiums as a 
permitted use on these lands.   
Accordingly, when the Bureau’s regulatory authority under SILA is triggered, 
administrative consideration of the impacts of proposed dockominiums and other 
emerging uses on the public trust appears, on its face, quite rigorous.  The 
advantages of working within an established operative regulatory framework are 
reason alone for the Bureau to be charged with assessing the public trust impacts of 
all proposed shoreland structures, regardless of whether they are sited in the 
intertidal zone or on submerged land.  (Besides, the Bureau’s review will be 
invoked with some frequency anyway because, as discussed in Part II.B, shoreland 
structures typically occupy or alter some portion of submerged lands—over which 
the Bureau has clear authority—in order to create access from the upland to the 
ocean.)  But given the Law Court’s longstanding declaration that private 
landowners hold fee title to the intertidal zone, combined with its recent declaration 
that the PTILA is unconstitutional, it is not surprising that this regulatory trigger is 
rarely pulled beyond the confines of Maine’s submerged lands. 
C.  Municipal Review:  Home Rule Authority 
Municipal review of emerging water uses can be as varied as the 
municipalities themselves.  This is because municipalities are authorized under 
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Maine’s home rule laws132 to “exercise any power or function . . . which is not 
denied to them” by the Maine Legislature.133  Accordingly, although no Maine 
municipality appears to have promulgated rules specifically related to 
dockominium developments to date, most towns and cities have enacted general 
land use standards and permitting requirements that, when combined with specific 
standards applicable to uses similar to dockominiums (such as commercial 
marinas), establish a regulatory framework by which municipal officials could 
review, and approve or reject, proposed dockominium developments. 
The Town of Kittery, for example, has adopted a land use and development 
ordinance that establishes a range of land use zones and identifies the uses allowed 
in each zone upon receipt of a permit, by special exception, or through a variance 
process.134  Under this framework, the Town accommodates, under certain 
circumstances and only in certain zones, functionally water-dependent uses135 and 
private marinas owned or used by a private group, club, association, “or other legal 
entity’s organization” primarily as moorings or docking facilities.136  Thus, the 
Town could grant a permit for the construction of a marina-turned-dockominium 
on its shores by interpreting its ordinance, in light of these two definitions, to 
include dockominiums among permitted uses.137  However, absent more explicit 
regulatory language, the Town is not likely to address issues surrounding the form 
of ownership contemplated for the dockominium development beyond establishing 
that the proposed developer of the dockominium is, in fact, the fee owner of the 
shoreland adjoining the river and that title will eventually transfer from the 
developer to the dockominium association.   
The Town of Kittery is far from unusual.  In fact, any land use framework that 
relies on static lists of land and water uses will suffer a similar fate of needing to fit 
proverbial “square uses” into “round zones” in order to adapt to a dynamic world of 
evolving and emerging uses.  The Town’s framework nonetheless illustrates a 
broader point:  Although Maine communities can, and often do, regulate land and 
water uses in starkly varied ways, when it comes to emerging water uses, 
municipalities rarely if ever appear to question the effects of such uses on public 
trust interests—despite having the home rule authority to do so.  Thus, even though 
dockominiums are likely to significantly alter the property rights of Maine’s 
waters, municipal reviews of such proposals are usually limited to establishing a 
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permit applicant’s right, title, or interest to the shoreland adjoining the 
dockominium, in the form of deeds, leases, or option agreements, and possibly to 
the submerged lands, in the form of a lease from the Bureau. 
D.  Regulatory Discord 
An examination of regulation of dockominiums at the federal, state, and 
municipal levels reveals both gaps in jurisdiction among these three levels of 
government and disparate treatment of water-related property rights where 
jurisdictions overlap.  For example, the Corps retains jurisdiction over the 
construction of dockominiums on navigable rivers, tidal waters, and the intertidal 
zone, but not on great ponds.  In contrast, the Bureau has jurisdiction over 
dockominiums on tidal waters (submerged lands) and those facilities that extend 
below the low-water mark of great ponds, but not on navigable rivers or most 
intertidal lands.  As a result, dockominium proposals on some categories of public 
waters are—at least ostensibly—subject to review by the Corps, others by the 
Bureau, and still others by both agencies.  To complicate matters, municipalities 
may, but are not required to, exert home rule authority over any proposed 
dockominium development within their municipal boundaries.   
Moreover, even though both the Corps and the Bureau are called upon in 
statute and rule to weigh the potential impacts of dockominiums on existing public 
property interests, these jurisdictional problems combine with practical and legal 
limitations on undertaking property ownership assessments of private ownership 
rights and public trust rights.  Accordingly, the Corps does not undertake 
independent evaluations of asserted property interests, and it is at best unclear 
whether such evaluations would be solicited by the Bureau.  At present, these 
governmental agencies are in no position to protect the public trust from the 
potential ill effects of emerging water uses and associated facilities, or to assuage 
the incremental privatization of Maine’s intertidal zone. 
V.  LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE INTERTIDAL ZONE,  
AND THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED JUDICIAL VOICE 
The dockominium serves as a useful illustration of the layers of legal 
uncertainty facing public and private entities in Maine who wish to make novel use 
of the intertidal zone.  
At the administrative level, the problems appear primarily in the form of 
jurisdictional disparity.138  The central issue, however, is not that the three levels of 
government overlap in their regulatory orbit.  After all, different layers of 
government can and often do coordinate reviews of development proposals.  
Rather, the problem is that administrative agencies give unpredictable depth and 
breadth of consideration to the public’s interest in water resources when evaluating 
emerging water use proposals.  Such incongruent, inconsistent, and all-too-often 
nonexistent regulatory assessment of public trust rights leaves a path of uncertainty 
with respect to the administrative protections offered to the public’s interest in the 
intertidal zone whenever a proposal for an emerging water use is presented. 
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The case-by-case judicial approach to resolving water use conflicts139 
compounds this administrative uncertainty.  In McGarvey, Chief Justice Saufley 
frankly acknowledged “the inconsistency of this incremental jurisprudential 
approach,” and recognized the need for a “gradual evolution” of the common 
law.140  However, the court’s two divergent doctrines in McGarvey do little to 
illuminate whether the court will, in fact, depart from the rigid Moody Beach 
holding in favor of a clearer view of the scope of the public’s interests in the 
intertidal zone.  Moreover, even if the court were to eventually embrace the 
reasoning in Chief Justice Saufley’s opinion, little guidance exists therein as to 
which types of public uses implicating the intertidal zone will be found consistent 
with the jus publicum and within the realm of “ocean-based activities,” and which 
types of emerging private uses will be found to interfere with the public trust.   
Consequently, Maine is left with an approach to public and private intertidal 
rights that, on the one hand, leaves the public with an unclear path as to what new 
public uses of the intertidal are within the scope of the public’s rights and, on the 
other hand, leaves private entities with uncertainty as to what emerging private uses 
may be subject to regulations aimed at protecting the public’s interests. 
A.  Incomplete Administrative Solutions 
There are, of course, several fixes to some of the more egregious jurisdictional 
holes in the administrative reviews of emerging water uses.  While an obvious 
patch would be to expand the jurisdictional scope of the federal or state agencies 
that presently have a role in evaluating many emerging water uses, this approach 
would likely be fraught with political challenges and institutional hurdles and, in 
any event, may not be the most efficient method of solving the problem.  Efforts at 
expanding the jurisdictional scope of the Corps are likely to be met with significant 
political resistance and, consequently, may have little chance of success.  And any 
future legislative attempts to broaden or clarify the Bureau’s purpose and mission 
might be viewed as a duplicitous effort to undermine the court’s 1989 Moody 
Beach decision invalidating the Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act on 
constitutional takings grounds, and could run the risk of another separation of 
powers battle between Maine’s judicial and legislative branches. 
Alternatively, municipalities whose boundaries adjoin coastal waters could 
exercise their home rule authority to resolve some of the administrative problems 
associated with emerging water uses.  For instance, municipalities could adopt a 
dynamic zoning and regulatory framework by which municipal officials or boards 
are empowered to review, and approve or reject, proposed structural development 
associated with emerging water uses.  To be effective, such a framework would 
need to include explicit analysis of the impacts of proposed water uses on public 
trust interests, rather than merely requiring developers to demonstrate right, title, or 
interest to the adjoining shoreland.  Although a municipal ordinance that brings 
emerging uses into the regulated sphere would not eliminate the need to regularly 
update review standards to address issues specific to already-identified emerging 
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uses such as dockominiums, it would certainly ameliorate the “square use, round 
zone” phenomenon.   
Although establishing meaningful municipal control over emerging water uses 
could certainly introduce an incongruent patchwork of town-by-town regulations, 
the benefits are at least three-fold.  First, Maine’s deep-rooted culture of local 
control would serve as a natural cushion against the type of political and 
administrative opposition that state- or federal-level jurisdictional expansions 
would likely face.  Second, the residents of the municipalities adjoining coastal 
resources are, in many respects, most likely to be directly affected by decisions 
about the allocation of water-related interests between public and private entities.  
After all, residents are the most likely fee owners of the intertidal zone at issue, and 
residents are the most likely users of the public trust due to their geographic 
proximity to the resource.  As a result, municipalities are well-positioned to do the 
kind of balancing of interests that is called for in resolving water use conflicts.141  
Finally, addressing the problem of emerging water uses at the municipal level 
would present the opportunity for a varied and customized set of solutions to the 
allocation problem.  In other words, there exists the opportunity for some creative 
bargaining.   
Unlike the situation in McGarvey, where public actors were allegedly intruding 
on a private right, emerging uses are more apt to trigger municipal involvement 
when a private actor allegedly intrudes on the public interest.  Dockominiums are a 
case in point:  Under a well-written, forward-thinking ordinance, a developer 
seeking municipal approval for a change in use of an existing water-based facility 
or for the construction a new facility would need to address the possibility that the 
proposal could affect the public’s rights.  The municipality would have an 
obligation to evaluate the impacts of a proposed dockominium on these public 
interests, and the ordinance would clarify the breadth and depth of this obligation.  
If any adverse impacts were found, a municipality might be justified in simply 
denying the proposal.  However, a well-written ordinance could make possible 
other forms of redress, including approval contingent upon the implementation of 
impact minimization and mitigation measures such as pedestrian public access 
easements across swaths of the intertidal zone and set-asides of a certain number of 
dock slips for public use.  Regulatory exactions such as these, which are aimed at 
offsetting the impacts of development on public resources, are within the scope of a 
municipality’s home rule authority.  Moreover, they would not cloud title so as to 
cause an unconstitutional taking of property, as long as a clear nexus exists 
between the exactions and the impacts and as long as the exactions are 
proportionate to the projected impacts of the development.142  At the very least, 
resolving water use conflicts through local decision making—and guided by 
ordinances tailored to the needs of the directly-affected community—would 
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engender much-needed open discourse about the appropriate allocation of water-
related property rights among public and private entities.   
B.  The Need for a Unified Judicial Voice 
Municipalities have broad power to protect the public interest when there is a 
direct structural intrusion upon the public’s interest to access the ocean; however, 
even the best administrative patches are not enough to fully address the legal 
ailments associated with public trust rights in Maine’s intertidal zone.  As 
discussed in Part V.A, municipal solutions under home rule authority would not 
resolve the McGarvey-type problems:  public intrusion on private rights.  And, 
absent additional guidance from the Law Court, even those municipalities with 
well-drafted ordinances would need to speculate (either as part of rulemaking or 
during post-rulemaking application) as to which water-based public uses should fall 
within or outside municipal considerations when evaluating the impacts of 
proposed water-based uses on the public trust.   
Given the court’s divergent views of the scope of public trust rights in 
McGarvey, this kind of municipal speculation carries with it some obvious risks.  
An overly broad interpretation of the public trust might lead municipalities to 
demand exactions that are not proportionate to the impacts, whereas an overly 
narrow interpretation might lead to insufficient mitigation measures and, 
consequently, harm to public interests through excessive privatization.  Moreover, 
saddling municipalities (or any administrative agency for that matter) with the task 
of setting the scope of the public trust would be a misplaced abdication of judicial 
responsibility, and would inevitably engender heterogeneous, town-by-town 
interpretations of uses that fall within or outside the protections of the public trust.  
This is hardly the formula for a stable and predictable property rights regime.  For 
these reasons, the difficult task of striking the proper balance with respect to public 
and private interests in the intertidal zone remains best placed with the Law Court.  
Many of the challenges faced by municipalities and other administrators would be 
eased if the court were to present a unified judicial voice regarding the scope of the 
public trust and the related balancing of society’s interests in a stable, yet evolving 
property rights regime.   
Auspiciously, the two fundamental objectives underlying the Law Court’s 
purpose-driven and elastic, action-based doctrinal approaches to resolving water 
rights controversies in McGarvey can be harmonized.  Despite their seeming 
inconsistency, society’s interest in a stable and predictable property rights regime is 
not inherently in dissonance with society’s interest in an evolving common law that 
embraces emerging water uses, whether public or private.  Both of these objectives 
could be honored if, rather than evaluating emerging uses on a case-by-case basis 
and with only static precedent as guidance, the court were to embrace a factors-
based approach to assessing novel uses of the intertidal zone.   
These factors do not necessarily need to deviate from the Colonial Ordinance’s 
three descriptive terms—so long as there is recognition that “fishing, fowling, and 
navigation” are to be interpreted as comprising certain classes of public uses.  For 
example, instead of itemizing the ways humans have or will “navigate” through or 
across the intertidal zone, the court could set forth performance-based evaluation 
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factors such as whether the use in controversy involves traversing the intertidal 
zone for the primary purpose of accessing upland, submerged land, or ocean.  
Likewise, the court could assert that uses involving the harvesting of plant or 
animal matter attached to the floor of the intertidal zone are outside the scope of 
“fishing” and “fowling,” rather than listing the various flora and fauna that humans 
now or in the future might wish to harvest.  The factors could, of course, also be 
based on other considerations, such as the underlying purposes of the Colonial 
Ordinance or principles of nuisance law, such as whether the use is a transient use 
causing de minimis nuisance on private ownership rights. 
Judicial enumeration of such factors would bring about much-needed 
predictability to Maine’s intertidal rights framework by making use of a familiar 
analytical tool to book-end the scope of the public trust in Maine’s intertidal zone.  
At the same time, a factors-based approach would leave much-needed room to 
accommodate emerging (and heretofore unimaginable) public and private uses of 
the intertidal zone. 
C.  Interim Measures for Practitioners 
As a legal construct, a dockominium situated on Maine’s coastal waters must 
grant private entities an exclusive property interest to a three-dimensional space in, 
on, and above the water’s surface, without infringing upon the public trust rights 
which burden that same space and without infringing upon the wharf-out rights 
which burden adjoining spaces.  In light of the existing judicial and administrative 
uncertainty with respect to Maine’s public and private intertidal rights, attorneys 
representing prospective purchasers and developers of dockominiums and similar 
emerging water-based uses that implicate the intertidal zone may wish to take a few 
simple, precautionary steps to protect their clients’ interests.   
First, attorneys should assess whether the emerging development proposal 
might fall within the ambit of the Wharves and Weirs Act.  If so, issues concerning 
the impact of the proposal on public trust rights, while not entirely eliminated, are 
significantly narrowed.143  Second, attorneys should recognize—in option 
agreements, deeds, and other real estate instruments—that the intertidal zone in 
Maine is burdened by a limited public easement, which, at the very least, 
encompasses the public’s right to fishing, fowling, and navigation, “generously 
interpreted,” and uses reasonably incidental or related thereto.144  This recognition 
is particularly relevant if the emerging development proposal will clearly and 
directly infringe on the public trust by permanently excluding the public from the 
three-dimensional space which it occupies.  Finally, notwithstanding the broad 
UCIOA definition for common interest communities, developers of dockominiums 
or similar facilities in Maine would be well advised to avoid unintentionally 
representing to future slip owners that they will hold an exclusive property interest 
in the affected water.  
                                                                                                     
 143.  The issues are not entirely eliminated, however, because an owner’s right to wharf out is still 
subject to reasonable regulation to protect public trust rights.  See supra note 77.  
 144.  See Bell II, supra note 71, at 173. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Law Court will soon be presented with another opportunity to reconsider 
the scope of the public trust in Maine’s intertidal zone.  A property dispute case, 
Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport—referred to colloquially as the Goose Rocks 
Beach case—is presently before the Superior Court (York County, Brennan, J.).145  
Although the case varies somewhat in its facts from both the Moody Beach cases 
and from McGarvey, the underlying concern is the same:  The upland property 
owners have filed a quiet title action and seek a declaratory judgment that they hold 
fee title to the intertidal zone, and that the public’s interest does not include a right 
to use the zone for general recreational purposes.146   
Among other grievances, the owners claim that members of the public have 
unlawfully used the intertidal zone for sunbathing, setting bonfires, picnicking, and 
storing boats on the beach.147  The Town of Kennebunkport148 counterclaimed that 
it holds fee simple title to the property, and that it acquired easement rights to the 
property by prescription and custom.149  In addition, the State of Maine, having 
been granted intervenor status, sought to have the scope of the public trust doctrine 
clarified in light of McGarvey.150   
After an extensive trial, the Superior Court issued a partial judgment favoring 
the Town, stating that “the public has the right to engage in, or cross over in order 
to engage in ‘ocean-based activities’ which can be categorized as fishing, fowling 
or navigating in the intertidal zone.”151  The court reiterated the two McGarvey 
analyses and concluded, without exposition, that the public’s right “includes the 
right to cross the intertidal zone for such ocean-based, waterborne activities as jet-
skiing; water skiing, knee-boarding or tubing; surfing; windsurfing; boogie 
boarding; rafting; tubing; paddleboarding; and snorkeling,” but not “swimming, 
bathing or wading; walking; picnicking or playing games in the intertidal zone.”152 
The Superior Court ruling is sure to be appealed,153 and the Law Court should 
be poised to present a single, coherent theory regarding the scope of the public trust 
in Maine’s intertidal zone.  Of course, the court could also continue its practice of 
resolving public trust conflicts in a case-by-case manner.  The implications of the 
judicial status quo, however, are solemn.  Clearly, judicial doctrine has a direct 
effect on the specific water rights controversies that come before Maine’s courts, 
                                                                                                     
 145.  See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Quiet Title, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 
YORSC-RE-09-111 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Oct. 23, 2009). 
 146.  Id. ¶¶ 46-49. 
 147.  Id. ¶ 40. 
 148.  The original named defendants were the Town of Kennebunkport and all persons, known and 
unknown, who claim the right to use or title in the property other than persons claiming ownership or 
easement under a  recorded instrument.  Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 
 149.  See Answer, Defenses & Counterclaims of Town of Kennebunkport, Almeder v. Town of 
Kennebunkport, RE-09-111 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Nov. 19, 2009).   
 150.  See Partial Judgment, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, RE-09-111, at 1-2 (Me. Super. Ct., 
Yor. Cty., Oct. 16, 2012) (Brennan, J.). 
 151.  Id. at 20-21. 
 152.  Id. at 21 (internal quotations omitted). 
 153.  See Tom Porter, Judge Sides with Town in Kennebunkport Beach Dispute, THE  MAINE PUBLIC 
BROADCASTING NETWORK (Oct. 18, 2012) (reporting that plaintiffs will appeal to the Law Court), 
http://www.mpbn.net/Home/tabid/36/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3478/ItemId/24261/Default.aspx. 
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and little has been done to date to stem the tide of this type of litigation.154  But the 
modern judicial approach to resolving intertidal rights conflicts also hinders 
federal, state, and municipal governments from resolving the discord permeating 
Maine’s regulatory review of emerging water uses.  Absent better guidance from 
the Law Court regarding the scope of the public’s rights in the intertidal zones, 
regulators will continue to struggle with—and likely altogether avoid—evaluating 
the impacts of emerging water use proposals on the public trust.  Consequently, the 
public’s interest in the intertidal zone might well continue to erode through 
piecemeal privatization.  The Law Court’s chosen method for deciding these types 
of cases will thus either signal the continuation of a case-by-case approach to 
addressing use conflicts in Maine’s intertidal zone with its attendant judicial and 
regulatory consequences, or represent a seminal step toward a comprehensive and 
predictable framework for intertidal rights among public and private entities. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 154.  Goose Rocks Beach is not the only case in point.  See, e.g., Susan Morse, Cliff Walk Backers 
Eye Goose Rocks Ruling, SEACOASTONLINE (Nov. 18, 2012, 2:00 AM) (reporting that the Town of 
York, Maine, may seek a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of  Cliff Walk, an historic stretch of 
oceanfront property in southern Maine), http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20121125-NEWS-
211250344. 
